A company of under forty people often has no IT staff at all. The website was built by one contractor, HubSpot was connected by a consultant, and the founder is the Google Workspace admin. Each system was set up well enough, and the logins between them belong to whoever set each one up, which is where an attacker who gets into one of them goes looking next. I run the cleanup myself, from the first backup to the follow-up check.
Keep the evidence, plan the lockout, close it in one session
- 01
Keep the evidence, then find every way in
Before anything is deleted, the first session copies the site, its database, and its logs off the host, and records every account, open session, and application password. Deleting an attacker's account also deletes its sessions and application passwords, with the login times and IP addresses they carry, so those are saved first. Then the timestamps and server logs show how they got in and what they touched.
- 02
The lockout order, in writing
You get the list of what to close, in order, before anything changes. If resets go out before the site can send mail, they never arrive. A new password doesn't revoke application passwords or API tokens, and in some systems it leaves open sessions working, so each one is revoked too, and a backdoor removed from the live site comes back with the next deploy if the development copy still has it.
- 03
One lockout window, then a follow-up
Every way in closes in the same session, so a door left open can't be used to reopen the others. Core, plugins, and theme go back on from clean copies and are brought up to date, and every key the attacker could have read is replaced.
Ruling out deeper access
The website is usually where it shows. The cleanup checks each system it connects to, because an attacker with admin on the site may also hold a key to the CRM or the mailbox that resets everything else.
The website and its host
Admin users, application passwords, scheduled tasks, code in the uploads folder, files that differ from a clean copy, and who is on the host's team list.
The CRM
HubSpot users, private apps, connected apps, and the tokens the website plugin and any private app use, with the date each one was last changed.
Forwarding rules, delegated mailboxes, and admin roles in Google Workspace or Microsoft 365, since that mailbox can reset every other password.
The domain
The registrar login, the DNS records, and the email that receives renewal notices, because whoever controls the domain controls where the site and its mail point.
What you get
The written account
The evidence, the order of events proven from timestamps and server logs, what is suspected, what is still unknown, what to do about it, and the next steps.
The access register
Every system, who has an admin login to it, and who should, so the next contractor is added and removed from one list.
The follow-up check
Two weeks after the close, the accounts, files, and logs are checked again against the register.
What to retire
Which plugins, integrations, and logins can go, and whether the site should stay where it is. If it should move to a smaller stack, that's a recommendation in writing, and the move is a separate decision.
If a client called you first
A HubSpot consultant or the web contractor is often the first call, and the cleanup works beside you. Your client keeps you for the CRM or the site, and you get the access register and the written account, so your next change starts from a known list of logins. A consultant's own admin logins reach every client portal they manage, which makes them worth checking in the same pass.
Proof
The cleanup draws on account-takeover response at Uber, designed, built, and owned for North America.
Common questions
Should we take the site offline?
Sometimes, and the first session decides it. A site that is sending visitors to an attacker's page should come down. A site that only carries a defaced page can usually stay up while the evidence is copied, which keeps the attacker from noticing early.
Clean it in place, or restore a backup?
A backup from before the intrusion is faster when you can prove its date, and it loses every change made since. Cleaning in place keeps those changes and takes longer to verify. The written account recommends one, with the reason.
Do we have to report it?
That decision belongs to you and your counsel. The written account gives them the evidence and the order of events to decide with.
Nothing has happened yet. Where do we start?
With the website security check, which brings the plugins, theme, and PHP up to date on a safe copy and checks every admin login before anyone else finds the gap.
Our host says it will scan the site. Isn't that enough?
A scan finds known malicious files. It doesn't check who can still log in to the CRM, the mailbox, or the domain, which is where the cleanup spends most of its time.